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Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Maryland v. Wilson,' the Supreme Court addressed
whether police officers can order an innocent passenger to exit
a vehicle when the driver is lawfully stopped for traffic viola-
tions.2 The Court held that, as a matter of officer safety, police
officers may order a passenger out of a lawfully stopped vehicle
without having any particular reason to believe that the passen-
ger poses a threat to the officer.3 The Court weighed the public
interest in effective law enforcement and the protection of po-
lice officers' lives against a passenger's liberty interest in remain-
ing free from arbitrary government intervention.4 The Court
found in favor of the public interest: a command to a passenger
to exit a vehicle may save an officer's life, while it affords only a
petty indignity to a passenger.5 Under Wilson, a police officer
needs only a lawful reason to make a traffic stop; having made
it, she is free to order all passengers to exit the vehicle for any,
6
or no, reason.
This Note argues that Wilson represents a departure from
prior Supreme Court case law that required Fourth Amendment
seizures to be based on specific, articulable facts that would lead
a police officer to believe that she is in danger. This Note con-
tends that the Wilson Court erred by refusing to recognize that
ordering the passenger to exit the vehicle constituted an illegal
seizure.8 This Note further argues that Wilson represents an iso-
'117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
2Id. at 884.
3Id.
' Id. at 885-86.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 886.
7 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
' Id. at 16 (noting that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and re-
strains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person").
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lated instance of Supreme Court authorization of the potentially
arbitrary use of state power to seize an innocent, non-
threatening person without any showing either of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.9 This Note concludes by advising
that citizens must now look to their state constitutions for any
analogous Fourth Amendment protection in this context.10
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution requires that
searches and seizures be reasonable and that warrants be based
upon probable cause." The text of the amendment applies only
to federal officers and does not contain a remedy on its face for
violations. Through the incorporation of the Fourth Amend-
ment into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
applied the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the individual states.13 The primary importance of the
9 The Court has previously authorized seizures and searches of all persons in a spe-
cific category, as long as the seizure was sufficiently controlled by rules or regulations
so as not to be random or capricious. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (finding that a sobriety checkpoint did not violate the Fourth
Amendment when all cars were stopped for a drunk driving check, even without any
individualized suspicion that the drivers were intoxicated); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding constitutional a stationary checkpoint at which
all cars were stopped to check for illegal aliens, without any individualized suspicion
that the car contained illegal aliens). See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that a roving patrol that stopped cars to search for illegal
aliens, without any reasonable or particularized suspicion that the car contained ille-
gal aliens, violated the Constitution); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (same).
'0 See, e.g., Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. 1992) (holding that
the sobriety checkpoint found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court
under the Fourth Amendment violates the analogous provision of the Michigan State
Constitution).
" The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (holding that a private cause of action exists for Fourth
Amendment violations).
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). The Fourteenth
Amendment reads in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
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application of the Fourth Amendment to the states is the impo-
sition of the exclusionary rule 4 as a tool to control state author-
ity and a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. 5 Using the
exclusionary rule, the courts have the ability both to oversee the
use of state power and to control that power by refusing to
authorize outrageous abuses of it.'
6
In earlier interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court required state actors, such as police officers, al-
ways to show probable cause before seizing a person. The state
actor could show probable cause to a neutral magistrate before
making a seizure, and thereby obtain a warrant authorizing the
seizure, 8 or the state actor could make the showing after seizing
a person when the person was on trial. 9 Absent a showing of
probable cause that the individual was engaged in wrongdoing
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within itsjunsdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
t4 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654 (holding that the exclusionary rule, which allows courts to
exclude evidence seized unlawfully, is an appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations). The exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent to overzealous police officers,
encouraging them to conform their behavior to constitutional standards. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). Requiring the officer to explain her actions to the judge
keeps judicial control over state action. Id. Should the judge decide that the police
officer's actions were capricious, unprincipled, or otherwise contrary to the Fourth
Amendment, the judge can exclude any evidence seized, making conviction difficult.
Id. A neutral judge, examining all of the circumstances, will be able to prevent police
excesses from overrunning individual liberties. Id. at 21. Fourth Amendment protec-
tions work because at some point, the conduct of law enforcement officials is sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny. Id. By excluding evidence seized illegally, the police will
lose the incentive to make illegal or unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. There is
some question, however, about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in controlling po-
lice behavior. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regula-
tions: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442,450-51 (1990); Robert Weisberg, Criminal Procedure
Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832, 855 (1985)
(suggesting that judicial review is too limited to offer any real protection against arbi-
trary police action).
's Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
'6 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12..
See, e.g., id. at 20 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)).
'8 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977) (affirming the sup-
pression of evidence seized without a warrant).
'9 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (providing a short his-
tory of cases holding that an officer's probable cause justifies a search or seizure in
the absence of a warrant).
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at the time of the seizure, however, the seizure was found un-
constitutional .
A. TERRY v. OHIOAND REASONABLE SUSPICION
In Teny v. Ohio,21 the Supreme Court authorized an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
22
The Court held that an officer's articulable suspicion may be
sufficient to justify a warrantless stop and search. The Court
defined articulable suspicion as a belief, not rising to the level of
probable cause, that the individual affords a danger to the offi-
cer.2 ' The suspicion must be based on observable facts, as op-
posed to hunches, that can later be articulated to ajudge. 2 The
Court emphasized that the circumstances of each situation pro-
vide the justification for a warrantless stop and search . Conse-
quently, Terry-type cases are fact-intensive.2
The facts of Terry convinced the Court that the officer's sei-
zure of the defendants was based on what he observed of their
behavior, in conjunction with his law enforcement experience:
28
A police officer watched the defendant and another man taking
turns walking back and forth in front of a store.2 At the end of
each trip past the front of the store, the defendant stopped to
speak to the other man. After observing this behavior for more
than ten minutes, the police officer approached the men.0
20 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948) (reversing the de-
fendant's drug conviction because the government lacked both a warrant and prob-
able cause when officers searched her apartment).
2'392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2Id. at 20, 27.
"Id. at 21, 22, 27. The case has coined the terms "Terry stop" and "Terry frisk,"
meaning brief stops and frisks that allow the police officer to determine if the de-
tainee is armed. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (refer-
ring to a Terry stop as one allowing officers, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, to
investigate possible criminality); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 44-45 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a Terry stop as one allowing police officers to
"accost citizens on the basis of suspicion"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
250 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to a Terry frisk as a "narrowly drawn
protective search for weapons").
24 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
Id. at21.
26 Id.
2See id. at 21-22.
28 Id. at 30.




When the officer asked the men for their names, they only
mumbled a reply, at which point the officer grabbed defendant
Terry.3' He patted the outside of Terry's jacket and felt a pis-
tol.3
12
The police officer's observation of the defendant, coupled
with the officer's experience, allowed him to conclude reasona-
bly that the suspects afforded a threat to the officer. The
Court acknowledged that, given exigent circumstances (in this
case, for example, a police officer observed two men "casing" a
store), the police may not have time to seek a warrant in order
to prevent a crime.34 Although the officer did not have prob-
able cause to arrest the men, his suspicion that the men were
(or were about to be) engaged in criminality was reasonable.9
If the officer were to leave the men to get a warrant, he would
36lose the opportunity to prevent crime.
Using a balancing test, the Court weighed the public and
private interests involved . On the government side, the Court
highlighted the interests in the detection and prevention of
crime and in the safety of police officers.' On the private side
of the scale, the Court found that the liberty interest of individ-
ual citizens was weighty, as the Fourth Amendment was written
to protect citizens from arbitrary government interference with
their liberty.39
Nonetheless, the Court found that the safety of the officer
outweighed the private interest at stake. 40 The officer must have
"specific reasonable inferences," not just "inchoate and unpar-
ticularized suspicion," that a certain suspect offers danger to
her.4' Thus, the Terry Court maintained that the Fourth
31 Id. at 7.
32 Id.
"Id. Particularly, the men's refusal to give their names and provide a reasonable
explanation for their perambulations in front of the store gave the officer reason to
believe that the men were not engaged in legitimate behavior. Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 20. The Court emphasized the "legitimate investigative function" served by
the police officer's actions. Id. at 22.
'7 Id. at 22-27.
m Id. at 22-23.




Amendment allows a seizure if a reasonable officer can point to
specific, articulable facts not arising to the level of probable
cause that lead him to believe that he should seize a suspect to
protect his own safety.
42
B. PENNSYLVANIA v. MIMMSAND THE RULE FOR DRIVERS
Since Tery, the Court has refined the balancing test that de-
termines whether a particular search or seizure was reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable sei-
zures.4 3 The seminal case in the area of seizures of motorists is
Pennsylvania v. Mimms.41 In Mimms, the Court determined the
relative reasonability of a seizure by inquiring into the state in-
terest in question and balancing it against the citizenry's liberty
interest.
4 5
In Mimms, police officers observed the defendant, Mimms,
driving an automobile with an expired license plate tag.46 They
stopped the car to issue Mimms a citation. An officer ap-
proached the vehicle and asked Mimms to step out of the vehi-
cle and to produce his driver's license and registration. As
Mimms got out of the car, the officer saw a bulge under Mimms'
jacket.49 Believing that the bulge might be a concealed weapon,
the officer Terry frisked 5 Mimms and discovered that the bulge
42 Id. Justice Douglas dissented in Terry, arguing that allowing police officers to
seize citizens without probable cause gives the officers more authority and power than
a judge, who cannot issue a warrant upon less than probable cause. Id. at 36-39
(Douglas, J, dissenting).
13 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); see also supra note 11 for the text
of the Fourth Amendment.
" Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106.
Id.




' See supra note 23.
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was, indeed, a loaded .38-caliber revolver.51 The officer then ar-
rested Mimms.
52
The Court held that the police had probable cause to stop
Mimms, and, therefore, concluded that the subsequent request
to exit the vehicle was merely a request to change locations dur-
ing a legal seizure.53 The Court distinguished Terry on the basis
that the initial stop or seizure in Mimms was clearly constitu-
tional, while in Tery the legality of the initial stop was at issue.54
Given the expired license plate tags, the officers had a right to
stop Mimms. 5 Since Mimms had already been legally "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment, the only issue before the Court
was the "incremental intrusion" into the driver's liberty occa-
sioned by the order to exit the vehicle. 6
Following the logic of Terry, the Court articulated a balanc-
ing test to determine the reasonableness of the order to exit the• 57
vehicle. Since the Fourth Amendment requires only that a sei-
zure be reasonable, the Court weighed the state interest against
the individual interest.5 s The Mimms Court maintained that it
was "too plain for argument that the State's proffered justifica-
tion-the safety of the officer-is both legitimate and weighty."5 9
The Court then examined the intrusion into the driver's liberty
interest caused by the order to exit the vehicle.o The Court
termed the order a "de minimus" intrusion, "a mere inconven-
ience," as it "expose[d] to view very little [more] of [the
driver's] person than is already exposed."6 ' Consequently, the
Court held that the safety of an officer making a lawful traffic
Interestingly, there was a passenger in Mimms' car. After frisking Mimms, the
officers also searched the passenger, who was carrying a .32-caliber revolver. No fur-
ther mention is made of the passenger in the original case beyond the mention of his
(and his gun's) presence. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107. After the Supreme Court's de-
cision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on remand, noted that the passenger had
pled guilty to the same charges of which Mimms was convicted. Commonwealth v.
Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 335 (Pa. 1978).
52 Mimm, 434 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 111.










stop outweighed the individual citizen's liberty interest, and
found that the officer could order the driver to exit the vehi-
cle.62
C. MICHIGAN V. SUMMERSAND THE AUTHORITY OF POLICE
OFFICERS TO CONTROL POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS
The state interest in protecting law enforcement officials
also led the Court to authorize officers to detain individuals at
their residences when serving search warrants. The Court in
Michigan v. Summer?65 held such a detention to be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
When police arrived at Summers' home to serve a search
warrant, Summers was leaving the house.64 The police stopped
him and brought him into the house while they conducted their
search pursuant to the warrant.65 After finding drugs in the
house, the police officers arrested Summers and searched him,
finding more drugs in his pocket.a
Thus, the question presented to the Court was whether the
officers had authority to detain Summers and require him to
enter the house while they executed the warrant.67 Noting that
such an order constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, the
Court compared the intrusion of such a seizure into a citizen's
liberty with the state's interest in law enforcement.6 Finding
that the search warrant itself was more intrusive than the deten-
tion at issue, and noting that the warrant had judicial approval,
62 Id. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the order to Mimms to exit the
vehicle was not related to the crime for which he had been stopped (driving with ex-
pired tags). Id. at 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, Marshall would not
have extended Tery to cover a Minms situation. Marshall also suggested to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court two alternate grounds on which they could achieve their
original aim of reversing the conviction: they could base their decision on the Penn-
sylvania Constitution's analogue to the Fourth Amendment, or they could reverse the
conviction and order a new trial on the ground that the prosecutor asked a witness
improper questions about the religious affiliation of the defendant. Id. at 115 n.3
(Marshall,J, dissenting). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose the second option,
ordering a new trial for Mimms (who had already completed his sentence for the of-
fense) on the ground that his religious affiliation had been improperly introduced in
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 335 (Pa. 1978).
6' 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
64 Id. at 693 n.1.
6Id.
Id. at 693.
67 Id. at 694-95.
6Id. at 696, 700-01.
964 [Vol. 88
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the Court found that the seizure was reasonable. 69 By granting a
warrant, a 'Judicial officer has determined that police have
probable cause to believe that someone in the home is commit-
ting a crime. ' 7° In essence, the judgment of a neutral judicial
officer supersedes the judgment of the officer in the field. Be-
cause of that neutral judicial officer's authorization, the police
officers are reasonable to invade the liberty of a resident of the
home while executing the warrant.7' In addition, the Court
mentioned that risk to the officers executing the warrant would
be "minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation. 72 By allowing the officers to detain
Summers while they searched the home, not only could the of-
ficers ask for his assistance in opening locked doors or cabinets,
but they could protect themselves from a surprise return or at-
tack.7 3 Thus, the Court held the seizure to be reasonable in the
interest of officer safety.74
D. WHREN v. UNITED STATES AND PRETEXTUAL SEIZURES
More recently, in Whren v. United States,75 the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment requires only that, in the ab-
sence of a warrant or an exception to the probable cause re-
quirement, seizures must be based upon probable cause.76
Because the officers had probable cause to seize the defendant,
the Fourth Amendment was not implicated in Whren.77
Whren was a passenger in co-defendant Brown's vehicle, a
Nissan Pathfinder with temporary plates.78 Plainclothes Wash-
ington, D.C., vice squad detectives, in an unmarked car, ob-
served Brown's vehicle stop at an intersection for about twenty
"9 Id. at 701-02.
70 Id. at 703.
7' Id. at 705.
7' Id. at 702-03.
7id.
74 Id.
71 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
76 Id. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 434 U.S. 1 (1968) (finding an exception for officer-
protective pat-downs); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (finding an exception
for hot pursuit). For a more detailed analysis of Whren, see Craig M. Glantz, Note,
"Could" This Be the End of Fourth Amendment Protections for Motorists?, 87J. CRIM. L. &
CRiNMNOLOGY 864 (1997).
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
7" Both Whren and Brown were young African-American males driving in a "high
drug area." Id. at 1772.
1998] 965
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seconds.7 The detectives decided to follow Whren and Brown.80
Brown pulled out of the intersection, turned right without sig-
naling, and sped down the street.81 Although the police officers
did not have probable cause to believe that either Whren or
Brown had committed any crime other than Brown's failure to
signal, the officers nevertheless stopped the vehicle. 2 At the
next intersection, the detectives pulled alongside and identified
themselves as police officers.8 3 As one officer approached, he
saw two bags of crack cocaine in Whren's lap.84 The officers
then arrested Whren and Brown.85
The Court maintained that because the traffic violation pro-
vided police officers with an objective, reasonable basis for the
traffic stop, any subjective motive of the officers in effecting the
stop was immaterial.86 Since the officers had probable cause to
stop the vehicle, the Court declined to apply a balancing test,
and held the seizure to be constitutional.87 The effect of Whren
is that so long as a reasonable police officer could have a good-
faith motive for a seizure and relies upon probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment does not require an inquiry into the subjec-
tive intent of the officers.88
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 8, 1994, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Maryland State
Police Trooper David Hughes observed a white 1994 Nissan








Id. Plainclothes vice squad detectives in unmarked cars are authorized to issue
traffic citations "'only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immedi-
ate threat to the safety of others.'" Id. at 1775 (quoting Metro. Police Dept.-Wash-
ington, D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A) (2) (4) (Apr. 30,
1992)).
17 Id. at 1776.
'Id. Some have argued that the holding in Whren substantially undermines Terry.
See, e.g.,Janet Koven Levit, Note, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the
Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. Ci. LJ. 145, 172-73 (1996) (asserting that Wiren
allows traffic stops on less than reasonable suspicion).
966 [Vol. 88
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more County.8 As he followed, Hughes noticed that the vehicle
did not have license plates; there was only "a paper tag kind of
hanging half off, half on that said Enterprise Rent-A-Car.""
Hughes activated the lights and sirens on his patrol Car, signal-
ing the driver to pull over.91 Instead of obeying Trooper
Hughes, the driver continued on for another mile'and a half be-
fore stopping.92
While pursuing the Maxima, Hughes observed that, in addi-
tion to the driver, there were two passengers in the vehicle.93
For the two and a half miles that he followed the car, Hughes
noticed that the passengers turned several times to look at him,
ducked out of his line of sight, and then reappeared.9 When
the driver finally stopped, Hughes exited his patrol car and ap-
proached the Maxima.95
As Hughes neared the Maxima, McNichol, the driver, exited
the Maxima and walked toward Hughes.96 Hughes directed
McNichol to move toward the rear of the -Maxima and met
McNichol about halfway between the two vehicles.97 Hughes
told McNichol he had been stopped for speeding and asked to
see his driver's license and registration. 98 McNichol showed
89 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (No. 95-1268).
The speed limit was 55-miles-per-hour on that stretch of 1-95. Hughes followed the
car for one mile, pacing it, and determined that the vehicle was traveling at 64-miles-
per-hour. He was alone in his patrol car at that time. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883.
'0 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wirson (No. 95-1268).
9' Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883.
92id93 id
Id. See State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). The petitioner's
brief characterized the passengers as "constantly moving . . . [and] continuously
duck[ing] below the seat level and then reappear[ing]." Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wil-
son (No. 95-1268). The respondent, however, supported by the trial court record, as-
serted that the passengers "turned and looked at the trooper four or five times, [and]
their heads went up and down four or five times, and they looked 'furtively.'" Brief
for Respondent at 1-2, Wilson (No. 95-1268).
" Brief for Petitioner at 2, Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (No. 95-1268).
Petitioner asserted that Hughes was hesitant to walk toward the Maxima, since the
passengers continued moving even after the car stopped. Id. at 2-3. The respondent
refuted this claim, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals made no finding either
that there was continued movement in the vehicle or that the Trooper was hesitant to
approach the vehicle. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 2; Brief for Respondent at 2, Wilson (No.
95-1268).




Hughes a valid Connecticut driver's license and informed
Hughes that he was traveling from Connecticut to South Caro-
lina.9 During this brief interview, Hughes noticed that
McNichol was nervous and, at times, seemed to be trembling.'
Hughes asked to see the vehicle registration, and McNichol
informed him that the papers were still in the car.'0 ' Hughes
then instructed McNichol to return to the vehicle to retrieve the
102
car's rental papers. McNichol got back into the car and sat in
the driver's seat.
03
Hughes also observed that the passenger in the front seat,
respondent Jerry Lee Wilson, appeared nervous and was sweat-
ing. 4 After McNichol had returned to the driver's seat, Hughes
asked Wilson to step out of the vehicle. 5 As Wilson got out of
the Maxima, crack cocaine fell to the ground' °6 Hughes drew
his firearm and arrested Wilson.
107
Wilson was indicted for possession of cocaine with the in-
tent to distribute, as well as for other narcotics and conspiracy
offenses.'0 8 Wilson filed a pretrial motion to suppress the co-
caine evidence, arguing that Hughes violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by ordering him out of the vehicle, and the
trial court granted the motion.1' The State of Maryland ap-
pealed that decision to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals."0
99Id.
" Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 883 (1997).
101 State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
2' Id at 2-3; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No. 95-1268).
'0' Wilson, 664 A.2d at 2-3.
'0 Wilson, 664 A.2d at 2-3; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No. 95-1268).
10' Wilson, 664 A.2d at 2-3; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No. 95-1268). The peti-
tioner asserted that Hughes feared for his safety. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No.
95-1268). The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court's finding that
Hughes was not afraid for his safety was not clearly erroneous, and, therefore, as a
finding of fact, it could not be overturned. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3-4. Surprisingly,
Hughes's fear for his safety, or lack thereof, had no bearing on the Wilson majority's
opinion, although the dissent makes much of it. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 887 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The petitioner also asserted that Wilson originally refused Hughes'
request that he exit the vehicle, but this was disputed by the respondent. Brief for Pe-
titioner at 3, Wilson (No. 95-1268); Brief for the Respondent at 2, Wilson (No. 95-
1268). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals did not find that Wilson resisted any
request by Hughes. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3.
" Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3; Brief for Petitioner at 3; Wilson (No. 95-1268).
.07 Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3.





The appellate court considered only the very narrow issue
of a police officer's right, during a traffic stop, to order passen-
gers to exit the vehicle.11' The court held that the police offi-
cer's right to remove a passenger from a vehicle stopped for a
traffic violation was not automatic; rather, it must be based on
some "individualized or particularized suspicion" that the pas-
senger either poses a danger to the officer or that the passenger
has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in criminal
activity.12  Because the record did not indicate any such evi-
dence, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the rul-
ing of the trial court suppressing the evidence seized in the
traffic stop."
The State appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Maryland's highest court, which denied certiorari. 4
The State then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted the petition for certiorari to determine if a po-
lice officer may automatically order a passenger to exit a vehicle
during a traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.
1 6
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court,"7 Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed
the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, holding
that police officers, without probable cause or articulable suspi-
cion of wrongdoing, may lawfully order passengers to exit a ve-
hicle during a traffic stop without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.
8
Analogizing the case to the situation in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms,"9 Chief Justice Rehnquist employed the Mimms balanc-
1 Id.
"2Id. at 12-13.
"1 Id. at 15.
' State v. Wilson, 667 A.2d 342 (Md. 1995).
" Maryland v. Wilson, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
16 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
17 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
"' Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
" 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment for a police officer to order the driver out of an automobile, incident to
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ing test. 20 In doing so, he noted that the State of Maryland in-
correctly relied on dicta 2 ' for the proposition that the Mimms
rule had already been extended to passengers as well as driv-
122
ers.
Examining the public interest side of the balance, ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist deemed it to be in the state's interest to protect
the lives of its law enforcement personnel.25 He acknowledged
the inherent dangers involved in traffic stops.124 According to
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the major distinction between interact-
ing with a passenger and interacting with a driver is that the
danger to an officer of standing in lanes of traffic on the driver's
side of the vehicle generally does not exist when the officer in-
teracts with a passenger.125
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that
when a vehicle contains passengers, the possibility of risk to the
officer increases. To protect herself, the officer must focus
her attention in more than one place: she must pay attention to
the driver of the vehicle (the person to whom she will issue a ci-
127tation), and to the passengers. Therefore, authorizing the of-
ficer to control the locations of all the occupants of the vehicle
ensures her safety.28  Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that,
despite the different interactions an officer has with a driver or
with a passenger, the state's interest in protecting the officer, as
well as the potential risk, was the same.9
Chief Justice Rehnquist then addressed the personal liberty
side of the balance, stating that the liberty interest of the pas-
a lawful traffic stop, even without a particularized suspicion that the driver poses a
danger to her). See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text for the facts in Mimms.
'20 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
121 Id. The dicta relied upon by the State of Maryland came from Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1047-48 (1983) ("[I]n [Mimms] we held that police may order persons
out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation."), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 155 n.4 (1978) ("[T]his Court determined in [Mimms] that passengers in
automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle,
once a proper stop is made.").
'22 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
123 id.
124 Id. The Court cited FBI statistics showing that in 1994, 11 officers were killed








senger is "in one sense stronger" than that of the driver.30 Un-
like the driver, the passenger has not violated any law.'31 The
driver's traffic violation occasioned the traffic stop, placing the
driver legitimately under official control. 2 The traffic violation
itself, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, gives the officer
probable cause to stop the vehicle, and it renders the seizure of
the driver reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.133 The
passenger, on the other hand, has committed no violation what-
soever, and a seizure of an innocent person, without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, would appear to be per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. T'
Despite the appearance of unreasonableness, Chief Justice
Rehnquist discussed the two basic concepts justifying the auto-
matic seizure of passengers as well as drivers. e 5 First, the pas-
senger is just as effectively seized as the driver, by virtue of the
traffic stop.'6 Second, the passenger is as motivated as the
driver to conceal a crime.3 7 Therefore, the danger to police of-
ficers from a passenger can be as great as that from a driver."38
ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted:
It would seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from
the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but
from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might .be uncovered
during the stop. And the motivation of a passenger to employ violence
to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of
the driver.9
The police officer may not know this until it is too late.40
Chief Justice Rehnquist, citing Michigan v. Summers,'41 noted
that public safety is increased if police officers remain in control
"
0o Id. at 886.
131 Id.
'" See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that a police officer
may order a driver to exit the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop).
", Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.






"' 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The Court, citing Summers, noted that "[tihe risk of harm
to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation." Wsn, 117 S. Ct. at 886 (citing Summers,
452 U.S. at 702-03).
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of the encounter.1 4 ' According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, even
if a police officer has no reason to suspect that any of the occu-
pants of a stopped vehicle pose a particular danger to her, al-
lowing her to control the location of all occupants enhances
public safety.
43
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his analysis by consider-
ing the wisdom of establishing a bright-line rule in this con-
text.44 Noting that the reasons for establishing such a rule are
different for passengers and drivers, he found that the state's in-
terest in officer safety is as weighty in both contexts.' 5 Accord-
ingly, the Court extended the Mimms rule 4 6 to passengers,
holding that police officers may, in the interest of safety, require
passengers to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle. 7
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented 4 8 on the ground that the Court
could have reached the same conclusion without stretching the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment.49 According to Justice Stev-
ens, Tery v. Ohid5° allows a police officer to order passengers
out of a vehicle during a traffic stop, without implicating the
Fourth Amendment, if the officer has an articulable suspicion
that the passengers pose a threat to her safety.'5' Extending the
Mimms rule to passengers, on the other hand, impinges on con-
stitutionally protected areas. 5' Furthermore, justice Stevens
noted, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that an exten-
.2 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
143 Id.
144 Id.
' Id. The Court addressed only the officer's right to order a passenger to exit a
vehicle. ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not express an opinion on the question of the
police officer's right to detain a non-lawbreaking passenger at the location while
completing the traffic stop.
146 See supra note 62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Mimms rule.
147 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
'
48Justice Kennedyjoined justice Stevens's dissent.
49 Id. at 887 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
15m 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing police officers to seize suspects about whom they
have articulable suspicions that do not rise to the level of probable cause). See supra
notes 21-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tery.
1 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 (StevensJ., dissenting).
t1 Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
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sion of the bright-line rule would accomplish its putative goal of
providing additional protection to police officers.53
Justice Stevens pointed out several flaws in the majority's
use of statistics to support its position that traffic stops are in-
herently dangerous.5 He attacked this assertion three ways.155
First, empirical evidence did not support the notion that as-
saults on police officers are fewer in jurisdictions that have al-
ready extended Mimms to passengers. 6 Second, there was no
suggestion that assaults on police officers ever occur in situa-
tions where the police officers have no reason to suspect that
they are in danger.1 57 Finally, comparing the number of officers
assaulted to the number of traffic stops annually, Justice Stevens
calculated that "the Court's new rule would provide a potential
benefit to Maryland officers in only roughly [twenty-five] stops a
year."158
While Justice Stevens agreed that the state's interest in pro-
tecting its officers was great in the abstract, he believed that the
majority underestimated the actual value of the liberty interest
involved.5 9 Although the intrusion on any individual passenger
may be minimal, the rule adopted by the majority authorized
the state to intrude incrementally on individual liberty numer-
ous times a day. 60 According to Justice Stevens, such a rule
would benefit police officers in only a few traffic stops out of
tens of thousands.161 At the same time, viewed in the aggregate,
the "thousands upon thousands of petty indignities" occasioned
by a rule allowing officers to order passengers out of a vehicle
inevitably "haLve] an impact on freedom that [justice Stevens]
Id- at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). The majority had used the statistics to assert that al-
lowing officers to remove passengers from vehicles would protect officers. Id. at 885.
Id. at 887 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
laId. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"8 Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens noted that this is only an estimate,
based on the fact that there are over a million motor vehicle cases in Maryland each
year and an assumption that Maryland had a proportional share of the assaults on po-
lice officers. Id. at 888 nn.4-5 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"9 Id. at 888 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
"o Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
"61 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
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would characterize as substantial.162 Justice Stevens therefore
would not extend the Mimms rule to passengers.1
63
Justice Stevens also noted a major difference between Wilson
and Mimms.'6 In Mimms, the Court recognized that the driver
of the stopped vehicle was already reasonably seized by virtue of
the traffic infraction itself.r' The passenger in Wilson, on the
other hand, had committed no violation justifying detention or
restraint.'6 In fact, the majority's holding allowed police offi-
cers to detain innocent civilians about whom they have no ar-
ticulable suspicion of wrongdoing. 67 According to Justice
Stevens, the majority for the first time allowed suspicionless sei-
zures not supported by the judicial approval that the Fourth
Amendment required.168
Therefore, Justice Stevens maintained that the preferable
course would be to continue to require police officers to make a
lower, Terry level 169 showing of suspicion before allowing them to
infringe upon constitutionally protected liberties. Justice
Stevens believed that a police officer must have "an articulable
suspicion of possible danger" before she may order passengers
out of a lawfully stopped vehicle. 1 In allowing police officers to
"seize" people who have committed no offense and present no
apparent danger to police officers, Justice Stevens believed that
the Court disregarded precedent that required a reason for a
seizure to be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.
1 72
C. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
Justice Kennedy dissented separately to emphasize his view
that the Court's decision seriously encroached on constitution-
"'
2 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'6' Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 889 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111 (1977)).
1 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
16 7 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 889-90 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
169 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (requiring police officers to base their ac-
tions upon articulable facts that do not necessarily meet a level of probable cause).
See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Teny.
170 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 887-89 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 887 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 890 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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ally protected areas.17s According to Justice Kennedy, precedent
supported the bright-line rule requiring that law enforcement
officers have an objective reason for their actions, even if that
objective reason is not the actual motivation for the seizure.17
Justice Kennedy believed that the majority's decision allowed
police officers to detain people who have done nothing
wrong.17 5 Justice Kennedy concluded that the Constitution
would no longer shelter citizens from the arbitrary exercise of
state power. Indeed, after this decision, citizens would be de-
pendent upon the largesse of the state for freedoms previously
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's holding in Maryland v. Wilson erodes
traditional Fourth Amendment protections.Iss Allowing police
officers to order innocent passengers out of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, without requiring those officers to have any reason for
seizing passengers, runs counter to prior case law interpreting
the language of the Fourth Amendment.'7
By incorrectly analogizing the case to the wrong precedent
of Mimms, the Wilson Court reached the wrong result. Because
the Wilson Court ruled that a police officer does not need a rea-
son to order a passenger out of a legally stopped vehicle, the
passenger cannot challenge the constitutionality of such an or-
der. Consequently, government action in such situations is pro-
tected from judicial review. Courts have no power to prevent
arbitrary police action in ordering passengers to exit lawfully
stopped vehicles. Fortunately, such protection may still be af-
forded to passengers under state constitutions.
'
7 Id. (KennedyJ., dissenting).
17, Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cf. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774
(1996) (noting that as long as there is a rational, objective reason for a police officer's
actions in stopping a vehicle, her subjective motives are irrelevant).
'7 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 891 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'78 See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 11-74 and accompanying text
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A. THE MAJORITY INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE MJMMSTEST
The majority incorrectly accepted the proposition that
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, s° rather than Terry v. Ohio,"" controlled
the outcome in Wilson.""2 Because Mimms involves an applica-
tion of Tery, the Court also should have considered the Terry
holding in its analysis. In addition, because Tery dealt specifi-
cally with the legality of the initial seizure,15 which was not at is-
sue in Mimms,8 4 but was an issue in Wilson,'5 the Court should
have adhered to the Terry standard rather than the Mimms stan-
dard.
186
In Wilson, the Court incorrectly applied the Mimms balanc-
ing test, failing to consider the legality of the seizure of the in-
nocent, non-threatening passenger. 7 In Mimms, the issue was
the incremental increase in the level of state control over a per-
son already legally detained.8 In contrast, Wilson involved the
initial seizure of an innocent, non-threatening person."s9
The Court should have begun its analysis by evaluating the
legitimacy of the initial seizure of Wilson. The Court virtually
ignored this issue, noting only that, "as a practical matter, the
passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehi-
cle."'1'9 Logically, it is true that the passengers were no longer
moving forward as a result of the police officer's legitimate traf-
fic stop. Such a stop, however, does not rise to the level of a
Fourth Amendment seizure until the state steps in to restrict the
"
0 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
... 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
112 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
183 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
184 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 ("In this case, unlike Tery v. Ohio, there is no question
about the propriety of the initial restrictions on respondent's freedom of move-
ment.").
IR Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
186 In Mimms, the police had probable cause to believe that they could seize the
driver of the vehicle, based on the traffic violation. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. By con-
trast, in Teny the police did not have probable cause to believe that the defendants
were committing a crime; therefore the initial seizure was litigated. Terry, 392 U.S. at
27. Similarly, in Wilson, the state trooper had neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion to believe that the passenger was committing a crime or was a danger to the
officer. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Md. 1995).
187 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
"s Mimmns, 434 U.S. at 109-10.




individual liberty of a person.'9 1 If the state actors were repairing
the highway, for example, the passenger would be stopped just
as effectively, yet that hardly constitutes a Fourth Amendment
seizure.92 A stop for highway repairs affects all travelers on the
highway, not any one person individually. Such a dispersed ef-
fect is constitutional.193 It is only when the state attempts to con-
trol an individual's liberty "by means of physical force or show
of authority" that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs'9 4 In
Wilson, the seizure occurred when the police officer ordered
Wilson out of the vehicle. 5 At that point, the authority of the
state actor overrode the will of the individual passenger.
Thus, the threshold question for the Court should have
been whether the initial seizure of Wilson was legal, rather than
whether the seizure was reasonable. 6 As Terry showed, the two
questions are separable.9 7 Applying Tery to the instant case, the
first question the Court should have asked was whether the offi-
cer had the right to seize the defendant. If the Court had in-
quired into the legality of the initial seizure, rather than into the
reasonableness of the seizure, the analysis would have begun in
the same place, by examining the events in the light of circum-
stances. Tery, rather than Mimms, however, would have con-
trolled the outcome. Terry requires the officer's actions to be
supported by specific and articulable facts indicating to a rea-
sonable police officer that a seizure is necessary to protect the
' Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
"' See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 889 (StevensJ, dissenting).
"3 Note that in such a case, when all persons traveling on the highway would be
stopped, the Court has authorized the seizures. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that a sobriety checkpoint did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when all drivers were stopped for a drunk driving check, even
absent an individualized suspicion that the drivers were intoxicated). Under Wilson,
however, the police may select which motorists to subject to state control. Such arbi-
trary state action has, in other contexts, been found unconstitutional. See supra note 9
and accompanying text.
'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The Terry Court discussed the definition of a seizure
and asserted that "[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. at
16.
195 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 889 n.8 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
" See id. at 884-85.
'97 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15-16, 19-20.
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officer.19 8 Mimms, on the other hand, involved an incremental
intrusion into the liberty of a citizen already legally seized.'9
Applying Terry to the facts in Wilson, it is clear that the sei-
zure of the passenger was not constitutionally authorized.2 ° The
totality of the circumstances-particularly the fact that the offi-
cer allowed the driver to return to the vehicle to get the regis-
tration materials-indicates that the officer did not believe
there were weapons in the car. 20' The trial court, which heard
the officer's testimony and was capable of judging the officer's
demeanor, ruled that the officer's decision to order Wilson out
of the vehicle was not based on articulable suspicion.2  Conse-
quently, the officer's order to Wilson to exit the vehicle was an
unreasonable seizure, violating the Fourth Amendment.203 The
cocaine discovered due to the illegal seizure should have been
suppressed.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS PEOPLE BY SUBJECTING
STATE ACTIONS TO JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
As the law stands after Maryland v. Wilson, police officers
may stop a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that a
crime, including a minor traffic violation, has been commit-
ted.20 4 An initial showing of probable cause or articulable suspi-
cion is required to stop the vehicle and seize the driver, but no
such showing is necessary to seize the passenger and exercise
the authority of the state. In addition, police officers may also
stop the car on a pretext-for example, if police officers suspect
the occupants to be in possession of drugs or firearms. As long
as the officers can point to an objective basis for the stop, such
as a traffic violation, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.0 5
8' Id. at 15-16.
99Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 3 (Md. 1995). The appellate court refused to over-
rule the trial court's finding that the arresting officer was not credible in testifying
that he ordered Wilson out of the vehicle because he had concerns for his own safety.
Id.
201 Id. at 3-5, 15.
1 2 I d. See supra notes 105 and 186.
213 Wilson, 664 A.2d at 15.
2
"
4Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
' Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (1996). "The practical effect of
our holding in Whren, of course, is to allow the police to stop vehicles in almost count-
less circumstances. When Whren is coupled with [Wilson], the Court puts tens of mil-
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Once the car is stopped, the police officers need to make no
showing of danger, or threat, or suspicion before seizing the
passenger. In other words, after Wilson, becoming a passenger
in an automobile entails giving up some Fourth Amendment
protections.
The primary Fourth Amendment protection a passenger re-
linquishes is the ability to have the state action reviewed by an
independent judiciary. °9 In a traffic stop, the police officer
must have a reason to pull over the vehicle.27 The officer, how-
ever, needs no reason to order the passenger to exit the vehicle.
As a practical matter, police officers will continue to assert Tery-
type articulable reasons for the order (officer safety being the
one most used). The primary change effected by Wilson is that
courts are no longer free to supervise officers.08
After Wilson, since officers need no longer articulate any
reason for commanding passengers to exit the vehicle, their ac-
tions are insulated from judicial review. Therefore, any rea-
son-or no reason at all-suffices to support an exit order. The
courts cannot review a police officer's judgment, to tell her that
ordering a specific passenger out of a vehicle was unreasonable.
The officer does not need to provide a reason for the order and
therefore need not testify on this point. This makes it much
easier for officers to behave "constitutionally" for unconstitu-
tional motives. Even if another clause of the Constitution pro-
209
vides an independent bar to the officers' actions, the officers
lions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police." Maryland v. Wilson, 117
S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (KennedyJ., dissenting).
The protection of the Fourth Amendment is not so much in its prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures, but in the power of the judiciary to curb arbitrary
or unreasonable police action. The Court fashioned the exclusionary rule as a way to
discourage illegal police activity. See supra note 14; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINr. L. REV. 349, 377-79 (1974); Andrew J.
Pulliam, Note, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment Approach to Automobile Investi-
gatory Stops, 47 VAND. L REv. 477, 478 (1994).
nSee, e.g., Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772-73.
In Wilson, for example, the trial court did not believe that the officer had an ar-
ticulable suspicion that Wilson afforded some danger to him. Wilson, 664 A.2d at 4.
Since Tery required some articulable suspicion, lack of such suspicion made the
search unconstitutional and the evidence was suppressed. Id. Following Wilson, how-
ever, the trial court now can not make a finding on the officer's actions; in the ab-
sence of some independent constitutional bar, the evidence will always be admissible.
Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars of-
ficials from acting in a (racially) discriminatory fashion. See supra note 13 for the text
of the Equal Protection Clause.
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need only remain silent as to their motivation for the exit order
and the court is powerless to stop them.
Subjecting police action to judicial review promotes the
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment: to protect people
from arbitrary police action.210 After Whren, police may fabricate
a reason to effect a specific traffic stop.21 ' After Wilson, they
212need articulate no reason whatsoever to seize a passenger.
Taking Wilson and Whren in conjunction, the police now have a
weapon to implement law enforcement, but also a weapon to
implement racial harassment. 3
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that control-
ling arbitrary police action against racial minorities is a Fourth
214SicthAmendment concern. Since the Court's interpretation of the
210 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing the impor-
tance ofjudicial review of police activities).
21' The officers in Wren were not authorized to make traffic stops. Whren, 116 S.
Ct. at 1775-76. The Court allowed the officers to make the stop on the ground that
they were police officers, and since other police officers on the police force could
make the traffic stop, it was immaterial that these officers could not. Id. It was also
immaterial that the officers pulled the defendants over, not because of the traffic vio-
lations, but because they suspected them of drug possession but had no probable
cause on which to base a search or seizure. Id. at 1776. In other words, the officers
were able to do what no court could have done: stopped, searched and seized the de-
fendants for drug possession without a warrant and without probable cause that a
drug violation had or would occur. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Whren.
212 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997).
213 From Teny to Mimms to Wdson, the Court has been aware of the dangers af-
forded to minorities by a stronger, less-regulated police force. See infra note 214. Ap-
plying the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to police officers was one way of protecting
minorities. In Wilson, however, the exclusionary rule does not apply since, by judicial
fiat, the police officer's actions in ordering a passenger out of a vehicle are always rea-
sonable.
214 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968). In earlier years, the Court was con-
cerned not only with the rights of the individual defendant appearing before it, but
with the systemic implications of any new rule. The Court recognized that:
The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which
minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped
by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial .... Nothing we say to-
day is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the legitimate
investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional re-
sponsibility to guard against police conduct which trenches upon personal secu-
rity without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Mimms, noted that "[s]ome citizens will be sub-
jected to [the] minor indignity (of being ordered out of the vehicle] while others-
perhaps those with more expensive cars, or different bumper stickers, or different-
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Fourth Amendment required probable cause before Terry and
articulable suspicion after Teny, police action was subjected to
judicial review. Following the decisions in Wilson and Whren,
however, police action is essentially unfettered in the area of
passenger exit orders.
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY STILL BE PROTECTED UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Any law enforcement official relying on Wilson to justify a
suspicionless seizure of a passenger may find such reliance to be
misplaced . The protection to individuals afforded to passen-
gers in vehicles before the Wilson decision may still exist, be-
cause most state constitutions contain specific prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures analogous to the
colored skin-may escape it entirely." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 122
(1977) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that "[w] e cannot
ignore the fact that Mimms and [passenger] Morrison were black nor can we ignore
the fact that certain adherents of the Muslim faith known as 'Black Muslims' have
been the subject of widespread unfavorable publicity .... ." Commonwealth v.
Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 336 n.7 (Pa. 1978) (on remand from the Supreme Court, or-
dering a new trial for Mimms on the grounds that the prosecution improperly intro-
duced evidence of the religious beliefs of Mimms and his passenger).
The Court also recognized that "[t]he Black Codes were a substitute for
slavery; segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes; the discrimination in these
sit-in cases is a relic of slavery." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1964) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). See also Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
(voiding vagrancy statutes for vagueness in part because of the danger of arbitrary en-
forcement); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991) (summing up
several studies detailing police encounters with minority citizens in a Teny context);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
Cf Robert Berkley Harper, Has the Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "Reasonable Sus-
picion" Resulted in the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 13, 38
(1988) (suggesting that socio-economic status, rather than race, motivates more citi-
zen-police encounters).
2,5 Ronald Susswein noted that the NewJersey Supreme Court had decided the is-
sue of the authority of police officers to order innocent passengers out of lawfully
stopped vehicles two years before the Supreme Court decided Wilson, relying equally
on the federal Constitution and on the New Jersey Constitution. See State v. Smith,
637 A.2d 158, 163-64 (NJ. 1994); Ronald Susswein, The Practical Effect of the "New Fed-
eralism" on Police Conduct in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CoNsT. LJ. 859, 869 (1997).
Susswein believes that the New Jersey rule, requiring articulable suspicion before a
police officer can order a passenger out of a car, survives the Wilson rule in NewJer-
sey. Id. Therefore, he continues to instruct law enforcement personnel that they
must abide by the NewJersey, rather than the federal, standard.
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Fourth Amendment.1 6  These prohibitions vary in language;
some are copies of the Fourth Amendment, while others adhere
merely to its spirit.217 Nevertheless, the protections afforded to
people under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion are usually also guaranteed to people independently by the
states.
In addition, the Tenth Amendment indicates that some de-
cisions would be best left to the states.1 8 While the area of state
autonomy is not mapped out in the Tenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has declined to decide some cases under the Con-
stitution, declaring that the states are in a better position to
eson219
make the necessary decision. In addition, state constitutions
may contain provisions that differ from the Federal Constitu-
tion, either in their wording or in their legislative history.2
Those differences may allow citizens of the individual states to
enjoy greater rights than those they enjoy as citizens of the
United States. State courts in recent years, under the new judi-
216 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 13; ILL CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. art. 26; MICH.
CONsr. art. I, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONsr. art. I, § 8; Tax. CoNsr. art. I, §
9.
217 Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."), with CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 ("The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons and things to be seized."), and MD. CONST. art. 26 ("That
all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places or to seize any
person or property, are grevious [sic] and oppressive; and all general warrants to
search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or de-
scribing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be
granted.").
28 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
219 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (de-
clining to impose a school-financing system, holding that that is appropriately the
province of the state). See also Robert F. Williams, Two Visions of State Constitutional
Rights Protections, 7 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 833, 836-37 (1997).
22 See supra notes 216-17.
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cial federalism, have been more willing to assert independent
state bases for their constitutional decisions.221
Judicial federalism recognizes that the Federal Constitution
provides a minimum threshold of rights. States may not grant
to their citizens lesser rights than those granted by the Federal
Constitution. The states may, however, grant their citizens
greater rights than those granted by the Federal Constitution.
They may do so by relying on the clause in the state constitution
that purports to grant the state analogue of the federal right. In
doing so, the states are not bound by the decisions of the Su-
preme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution. 2 In addi-
tion, resting the decision on an independent state ground
shields the decision from review by the Supreme Court.2
Therefore, despite the Supreme Court's holding that exempts
passengers from Fourth Amendment protection, that protection
may still exist under state constitutions. Although the Court has
abridged certain rights formerly retained by the people, states
may still secure those rights to citizens through their state con-
stitutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Maryland v. Wilson, the Supreme Court held that police
officers may, as a matter of course, lawfully order passengers to
exit a vehicle during a traffic stop without implicating the
Fourth Amendment.224 After analogizing the case to Pennsylva-
nia v. Mimms,2u the Court applied the Mimms balancing test to
determine the reasonableness of the officer's order to the pas-
senger to exit the vehicle.2 6 The Court held that the state's in-
terest in officer safety outweighs a passenger's interest in
,2' See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology
and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE
DAmEL. Rrv. 1015, 1016-17 (1997).
' Commonwealth v. Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 337 (Pa. 1978) ("Disposition on state
grounds... preserves a body of state law independent of decision of the United
States Supreme Court.") (Roberts,J., concurring).
223 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction only because the Delaware Supreme Court decision rested as much on
the Fourth Amendment as on the state constitution).
22 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
25 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
'6 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884-85.
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remaining free from arbitrary government intervention. Con-
sequently, the Court approved a bright-line rule allowing police
officers to order passengers out of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
without a showing that the passengers offer any danger to the
officer. 8
The Wilson Court used Mimms as the standard when it
should have adhered to the standard articulated in Terry v.
Ohio.2  Under Terry, if an officer does not have probable cause,
she must have specific articulable facts to justify the initial sei-
zure of a person.230 Adhering to the Terry standard would have
led the Court to the conclusion that the order to Wilson to exit
the vehicle was an illegal seizure. The decision as it stands is a
departure from prior case law that required law enforcement
personnel to articulate a reason before effecting a seizure.2'
Requiring police officers to state reasons for seizing an individ-
ual will ensure judicial scrutiny of police actions, and prevent
the police from using the laws in a discriminatory, arbitrary
manner. Finally, although Wilson establishes a bright-line rule
for law enforcement, the Federal Constitution is only the lowest
threshold of protection. The new judicial federalism may pro-





m 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2" Id. at 30-31.
231 id.
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